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The report of the Federal Trade Commission to the President on Steel
Sheet Piling,' the Wheeler Anti-Basing Point Bill, 2 and the Government's
attitude toward uniform prices 3 again focus the attention of businessmen on
the legality, as well as the commercial value, of basing point or freight zoning
systems. There has been a pronounced trend in recent years for sellers to
meet competition by adopting various more or less mechanical methods of
dealing with freight costs in arriving at a final sale price.4 Thus, in an increasing number of industries the practice of employing "basing-point",
"multiple basing-point", and "delivered-price" systems has become customary. 5
The purpose of most of these systems has been, in the main, three-fold:
(i) to simplify figuring freight quotations; 6 (2) to enlarge the market of a
given manufacturer by enabling him to quote a price which, by absorbing
some freight charges, will compete with (or by adding additional charges for
freight will be identical to) that of another manufacturer whose factories are
situated in some other locality (in other words, it is an attempt to eliminate
geographical position as a substantial element in competition) ; and (3) to
enable competitors to agree on, or otherwise to arrive at, uniform prices with

t

A. B., 1932, LL. B., I935, Cornell University; member of the New York bar.
i. Fed. Trade Com., Report on Steel Sheet Piling, 1936. This report was referred by
the President to the Attorney General on June 15, 1936, for appropriate action. N. Y. Times,
June 22, i936, p. i, col. i.
2. S. i58i, 75th Cong., ist Sess. (937), introduced February 17, 1937, 8i Cong. Rec.,
legis. day Feb. I5, 1937, at 1562. This bill is identical with S. 4055, 74 th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1936), introduced January i6, 1936, 80 CONG. REc. 24o (1936), and H. R. 11329, 74th Cong.,

2d Sess. (936), introduced on the same day, 8o CONG. REc. 2534 (1936). See also a proposed amendment to Section 2 of the Clayton Act, H. R. io486, 74th Con., 2d Sess. (1936).
These Anti-Basing-Point bills are discussed in more detail infra, and see Hearings before
Seniate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 4055, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (936).
3. Id. at 286-288; see Editorial,N. Y. J. Comm., June 23, 1936, p. 2, col. i.
4. Fed. Trade Comm., supra note I, at 37-39.
5. The following industries use a zone price system: iron and steel, tobacco products,
thread, stoves, mahogany, asphalt, mastic tiles, salt, bathtub, alcohol, coffee, soap, corn products, linseed products, cereal products, newsprint, paper, gasoline and oil products, wire and
cable, valve and fittings.
The following industries use basing-point systems (or modifications thereof) : lumber,
steel and iron, cement, zinc, corn products, copper, fertilizer, gasoline, lead, sugar, laundry
machinery, crane and shovels, flour, range boilers, bolts, nuts and rivets, cast iron pipe,
asphalt roofing, linseed oil. It should be noted that some materials are sold part on one and
part on the other system. Generally speaking, the industries using such freight systems are
those which have standardized products, or products which conventionally are of uniform
grade and quality.
6. The United States parcels post service and the American Express Company both use
zoning systems as a matter of convenience.
(6go)
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greater ease, pursuant to some understanding between them. 7 The first reason for using such systems is of undoubted legal validity. The second has
8
been seriously questioned in this respect by the Federal Trade Commission,
and the third is certainly prima facie illegal since it amounts to a violation of
Section i of the Sherman Act.9 These three are by no means the only advantages of such systems. In addition, there is for some products an advertising advantage in being able to offer a uniform price, and such systems eliminate the mechanical unwieldiness and the prohibitive cost of price schedules
which would otherwise have to be translated from a maze of differing freight
rates into a price schedule which would reflect those differences.' 0
The charge was repeatedly made by consumers, economists, and
others 11 that such methods of arriving at prices amounted to discrimination
under the old Section 2 of the Clayton Act 12 in that the sellers have, after
making an allowance for the cost of transportation among their various customers, exacted higher prices from customers having little or no transportation expense and accepted lower prices from those having heavy transportation expense. The same argument against the validity of such practices will
undoubtedly arise under the Robinson-Patman Act.13
Another criticism of such systems is that they result in the receiving by
the Government and others of identical bids or price quotations from manufacturers. 1 4 To blame such uniformity solely on delivered-price systems is
to overlook the distinct possibility that prices on a standardized commodity"
will tend to be uniform if effective competition exists. It is, of course, apparent that such freight systems might be a great aid in helping to police
price agreements, but the systems themselves might still not be illegal. It
should perhaps be pointed out that mere uniformity of price is not per se
illegal. Even uniformity of prices arrived at by merely "following the
leader" is not illegal, except where there is an agreement or understanding
7. Fed. Trade Comm., sitpranote i.
8. See the following Fed. Trade Comm. reports: The Price of Gasolines in 1915-1917,
IgI8, at 149, 15o, 153-154, I56; The Advance in the Price of Petroleum Products, 192o, at 54;
Commercial Feeds, I921, at 12o n., 163-164; Lumber Manufacturers Trade Associations, 1922,
at 121; Western Pine Manufacturers Association, 1922; 2 Home Furnishings, 1923, at 89;
Northern Hemlock & Hardwood Manufacturers Association, 1923, at ix; Prices, Profits and
Competition in Petroleum Industries, 1928, at 71; Newsprint Paper Industry, 1930, at 37-44;
Price Bases Inquiry: The Basing-Point Formula and Cement Prices, 1932; Basing-Point
System in the Iron and Steel Industry, 1934; Practices of the Steel Industry under the Code,
1934; Range Boiler Industry, 1936; Steel Sheet Piling, 1936; and see Fed. Trade Comm.,
supranote i. See also Tariff Comm. Information Survey, Cotton Thread, 1927.
9. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), I5 U. S. C. A. § I (1927).
IO. Supra note 6.

ii. See especially FTR, THE
HARv. L. REV. 548.

MASQUERADE OF MONOPOLY

38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 13 (1927).
13. 49 STAT. 1526, 15 U. S. C. A. § 13 (Supp. 1936).

(I93I); Note (1932)

45

12.

14. Fed. Trade Comm., supra note i, at 286-288, where Secretary of the Interior Ickes
lists some 48 industries where identical prices have been bid.
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among competitors that they will do so. 15 This type of economic discrimination may properly be called geographical discrimination, because the amount
of transportation service provided varies as between different customers.
Geographical discrimination may be said to exist whenever sale prices, after
the proper deduction of transportation costs (which are usually capable of
being exactly determined), yield net prices at the factory or warehouse which
differ because of the geographical location of buyers.' 6 Such discrimination
would cease to exist only when the net at the point of shipment received
from all sales would be uniform at a given time. The fact that such practices
often result in economic discriminations does not render them illegal under
the Anti-Trust Laws.
The systems which are employed so as to manage or manipulate
freight costs are numerous, the best known being the so-called PittsburghPlus plan 17 of the steel industry. The old Pittsburgh-Plus was a basingpoint system by which steel products were sold at a price equal to the factory
price plus the actual cost of freight from Pittsburgh to any destination. This
freight charge from Pittsburgh was added even though the steel may not
have been actually shipped from there, with the result that purchasers in
Chicago paid freight from Pittsburgh, although the steel would probably be
shipped from the neighboring mills at Gary, Indiana. Custom, central location, and superior competitive position were probably instrumental in the
establishment of Pittsburgh as the steel basing-point, and the custom was
solidified by agreement or understanding or for the sake of convenience, even
after some of the more fundamental reasons for its establishment had ceased
to exist.
The single basing-point system was one of the earliest methods of arriving at an artificial equalization of freight charges. The need for added basing-points due to competition from factories in new localities has led to the
so-called multiple basing-point system, wherein prices are determined as of
the basing point nearest to the purchaser. Other systems are to sell on a
15. United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U. S. 693 (1927). The court states:
"And the fact that competitors may see proper, in the exercise of their own judgment, to
follow the prices of another manufacturer, does not establish any suppression of competition
or show any sinister domination." Id. at 709. Compare also Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n
v. Federal Trade Comm., 4 F. (2d) 457 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925), nodified, 273 U. S. 52 (1927).
16. There are, of course, methods of arriving at a varying mill-net price other than the
use of basing-point, freight-zone or delivered-price systems. Rebates, special freight allowances, or varying charges for freight pickups may be utilized so as to reach the same result.
In general the legality of such rebates may be seriously doubted, especially under the Robinson-Patman Act. This subject will, however, not be considered herein.
17. BE GLUND, THE UNiTED STATES STEEL CORPORATION (1907)

164-167; Krentzberg,

The Passingof "PittsburghPlus" (1924) 17 Am. BANKERS A. J. 301. No detailed history of
the origin of Pittsburgh-Plus is available; testimony before the Federal Trade Commission in
Matter of the United States Steel Corporation, 8 FED. TRADE Comm. DEC. (1924) 1, indicates that it was in use in the sale of beams in 188o, but was not generally applied until after
the formation of the United States Steel Corporation in 19ol. By 1907 it was well established.
BERGLUND, loc. cit. supra.
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flat delivered price for a given area or for the entire country, or to divide the
country into freight zones and sell products at a uniform delivered price for
each zone. All of these systems have much the same purpose and in general
operate with similar effect, although the economic situation in some industries seemed to make one system more adaptable than another.
Any discussion of the law of such freight systems requires a clear unThe
derstanding of the economic background of the various practices.'
Supreme Court has repeatedly pointed out the necessity of clearly understanding the factual background in each anti-trust case. 19 For that reason
the facts which are typical of a number of manufacturing industries will be
set forth briefly.
The manufacturers in these industries, which in the main had grown up
along the Atlantic seaboard, originally sold their products f. o. b. factory,
charging the actual freight to the destination if a delivered price were desired. By the early years of the twentieth century some companies had varied
this method of arriving at a sale price, so that some large producers sold at a
uniform delivered price in each state, while others sold on actual freight east
of the Mississippi River and had adopted a modified basing-point system west
of the Mississippi. During the World War the War Industries Board
adopted a plan in placing orders for cantonment camps in order to insure an
adequate supply of necessary materials. The Board also approved a zoning
plan for certain industries, apparently with the thought that this was also
necessary in order to insure an adequate supply of equipment. After the War
and the depression of 1920, the practices of these industries were rapidly becoming more uniform in sales of competing products. Products which were
smaller in size and weight, since they were not subject to such noticeable
price variations when the actual freight was charged, generally used a close
approximation to the actual freight rates from the points of production to
those of consumption. The larger and heavier products, for which price
variations due to freight costs were substantial, came to be sold by most
producers on a basing-point or a freight-zone system.
The N. R. A. took no stand on the question of geographical discrimination in price. 20 As a result, a number of the codes provided for freight-zone,
I8. For a good discussion of the general economic background of such freight systems see
BURNs, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION

(1936)

280-371.

ig. Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U. S. 344, 360-361 (1933) ; Sugar Institute
v. United States, 297 U. S. 553 (1936).
2o. But see Richberg's remarks in Hearingsbefore Senate Committee on Interstate Colninerce, supra note 2, at 85-86: "It was our observation, and it was the opinion of the experts
outside whose aid we obtained, that a basing-point system in which every producing area was
a basing point would be a sound and economical system and good business practice. In other
words, if there were a lot of mills within a small radius of 25 to 5o miles of Pittsburgh, as a
business practice there was nothing wrong, and a great deal of convenience and benefit in
having one basing point for that area. The evil in the basing-point system that seemed to me
evident from the beginning, and which I think is partly historical growth and partly the result
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basing-point, or delivered-price systems.2 . In industries such as lumber, cement and insulated cable, where these practices had become an industry custom or practice before the codes, they were continued under them, and the
practices became more standardized due to the existence of open price filing
provisions in the codes. All of the N. R. A. codes had a pronounced effect
upon their respective industries in crystallizing and unifying industry practices, especially if they provided for open price filing. 22 The termination of
the N. R. A. era, therefore, generally left industry practices stabilized.
The fact that most of the factories in many industries were located in
New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Connecticut seemed to aid those
industries in arriving at freight systems. The freight zones, then, which these
industries used, represented places which would have had approximately
equal freight rates for goods shipped from New York City, and the freightzone charges were approximations of actual freight costs. As factories were
built in other sections of the country, freight-zone charges bore less relation
to the actual costs of transportation.
When basing-point or freight-zone systems are employed, prices are
generally quoted on a delivered-price basis. As a result, customers are not
aware of how much of the final price is in fact a charge for freight.23 Under
these systems each manufacturer defrays at times a part of the actual transportation costs; at other times he may receive more than the actual freight
costs if he is located near the consumer, and he charges the railroad freight
from some recognized center of production or an average zone freight rate.
The trend in these industries, as in many others, has been to charge
transportation cost on products which were light in weight and easy to ship
at the actual freight rate, or else to use a flat delivered price for the entire
country, since in either case competitors having similar factory prices would
have comparable prices f. o. b. the customer's city. With heavier or bulkier
items, since the differences in price would vary considerably with the
distance from the customer's city, and the manufacturer nearest any given
purchaser had such an advantage, competitors were forced to (i) abandon
their efforts to compete; (2) lower their factory price so that that price plus
freight was competitive; or (3) maintain the current factory price in appearof the power of certain large interests in the industry, has been the denial of basing points to
certain producing areas that ought to have basing points, and, as a result, the establishment
of artificial basing points in nonproducing areas, giving a special advantage to the producing

areas which did have basing points."
21. Six codes provided for freight systems. They were: Fertilizer, Petroleum, Business
Furniture, Storage and Filing Equipment, Salt, and Shovel Dragline and Crane. Five codes
provided for basing-points. They were: Cast Iron Pipes, Iron and Steel, Lime, Refractories,
and Reinforcing Materials. Thirty-three other codes provided for delivered prices of some
kind. For further material see Consumer Advisory Board, Appendices to Memorandum to
General Johnson, Feb. ig, 1934.
22. Fed. Trade Comm., supra note i, at 6.
23. Hearings before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, supra note 2, at 322.
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ances and absorb some or all of the freight charges. The manufacturers in
many industries chose to employ the third alternative as long as they could
realize a sufficient price on their product to pay the current costs of production plus transportation and a proportion of their current obligations on their
fixed charges.
Manufacturers believed, and no doubt they arrived at their belief
through sad experience, that it was virtually impossible to maintain one factory price for customers located close to a factory while maintaining progressively lower prices as the customer's situs approached the factory of an effective competitor. All customers on learning of the lower price would
demand it and feel entitled to it. Delivered-price policies, basing-points and
freight zones were all devised to enable the manufacturer to quote competitive
prices in a district close to a competitor's factory without apparently reducing
the factory prices.
Freight-zone policies had to be strictly adhered to or they would break
down. If purchasers were allowed to have goods shipped to a point in one
zone, and were then to pay the actual freight to another zone, the resultant
price might be less than the delivered price to that zone, and the system
would crumble of its own weight. As a result, sellers never quoted any price
other than that of the customer's city, and a purchaser was not allowed to
purchase f. o. b. manufacturer's mill except at a price equal to that which
would have been charged at the ultimate destination. As a logical result,
allowances were often not made to purchasers even though the goods were
shipped by water or by other methods cheaper than the standard all-rail
freight. Manufacturers seemed to feel that these delivered-price practices
were necessary in order to maintain their system, since purchasers would
always have taken the cheaper alternative and thus have made the manufacturer absorb a larger proportion of the freight charge on distant shipments,
preventing him in some cases from equalizing the freight charges among all
of his customers.
Economically, and presumably legally, identical problems are presented
by flat delivered prices and by freight-zone adders, provided all the plants
manufacturing the product are to be found in one single zone. The problems are identical because the price in the basic zone, where the factories are
located, is a flat delivered price. As far as zones other than the basic one
are concerned, since the freight zones have increasing freight charges, the resulting price more nearly equals the mill price plus the actual freight.
Freight zones are, therefore, at least in part a recognition of the fact that
freight costs may be competitive elements. Flat delivered-price systems and
basing-point systems where the factory is not located at or near the basingpoint represent a wider departure from the so-called pure competitive posi-
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tion, since the actual freight in the price of the article has little to do with
the actual cost of the freight.
The location of plants outside the basic zone which charge basic zone
prices plus freight from that zone would seem to be economically unjustifiable
unless costs of production are higher. Such manufacturers must consider,
before lowering their prices, that these lower price levels would compel competing manufacturers to install branch factories which would overexpand
the production in that area and might lead to an even smaller volume of busiiness. The factory located nearer to certain customers has an advantage in
the point of delivery time which is bound to give him a sufficient volume of
business in a stabilized market.
The contention has been made that free competition can exist only if
goods are sold at a price equivalent to the cost plus profit at the point of shipment plus the actual cost of freight to the destination, and that any other practices involve illegal discrimination. 24 Acceptance of this assumption would
involve the prohibition of selling goods over any area, however small, at a
flat delivered price. The argument that flat delivered prices for any given
area prevent customers from freely competing with each other at the point of
production has some merit, provided it is not carried to its logical but absurd
extreme of requiring a department store to make varying delivery charges to
customers living in the same urban area. When viewed on a national scale,
it is apparent that such systems 'must necessarily operate in certain instances
to discriminate against customers adjacent to the point of production (or near
freight zone lines), since they may be required to buy goods and freight when
they are interested solely in buying goods.2 5 Those advocating this contention then point out that the result of this system is wasteful cross-freighting,
in that it enables manufacturers to compete outside the spheres surrounding
their factories. This evil of cross-freighting has certainly been overemphasized, 26 although its full extent would be ascertained only if a thorough study
24. This contention was made by Fetter, Commons, and Ripley as expert witnesses for
the Federal Trade Commission in Matter of the United States Steel Corp., 8 FED. TRADE
Com. DEc. (1924) I.
25. A logical extension of these arguments would require a seller to itemize all his costs,
and would make it illegal to sell below the total even to meet competition in good faith.
26. In Fertilizer Industry Price Filing Study, NRA Work Materials No. 67, at p. 33, it
is stated that: "This very brief survey would indicate that cross-shipping between (freight)
zones is not a very serious problem." In Fed. Trade Comm., The Basing Point Formula
and Cement Prices, 1932, at 134 et seq., it is estimated that the cross-haul in the cement industry results in a waste of $42,ooo,ooo. The study, however, is not very complete,
and is more in the nature of an estimate. See also Richberg in Hearings before
Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, supra note 2, at 86: "I want to say as a
general proposition, which I believe to be correct, that for the consuming public as a
whole, I think our investigations developed that more freight was absorbed than
excess freight was charged. That is, in order to meet competition in these competing areas
the producer has to absorb a great deal of freight; . . . as to the industry as a whole, in
relation to its customers, we had one investigation made which showed a large excess in
favor of the customers. That is, there was more freight absorbed than excess freight
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were made. Opponents of such systems also charge that they artificially
maintain plants that were established under economic conditions which no
longer exist. As a result, therefore, uneconomic factories are maintained in
order to protect past investments. 2 7 It is possible to agree, in the main, with
these contentions insofar as they are demonstrations of pure economic theory,
but it is another question when this economic theory is attempted to be read
into the Anti-Trust Laws, since there are types of discrimination which are
not subject to their operation. The basic legal question is whether or not the
law sanctions only price policies which make proportional allowances for differences in the costs of transportation.
It has been found convenient to discuss the freight systems with reference to each of the Anti-Trust laws separately. The Sherman Act is considered first because of the fact that more cases bearing on this question are
found under it, even though the Act is not primarily concerned with price
discrimination.
THE SHERMAN ACT

Since the Sherman Act 28 is primarily concerned with agreements, combinations, or conspiracies which restrain competition and trade, freight systems will be considered only when they are connected with such problems. A
contract, agreement, combination, or conspiracy to arrive at a basing-point or
other freight-destination system is a combination in restraint of trade and
therefore illegal if it is unreasonably "restrictive of competitive conditions". 2 9
It would seem that under most circumstances an agreement to sell solely by
certain freight systems would be an illegal restraint because of its effect on
free and effective competition between the agreeing parties.
In several Sherman Act cases it has been charged that the collection and
distribution by a trade association of information which aided the use of
freight systems and other uniform practices was an illegal restraint of trade.
In the Maple Flooring30 and Cement 31 cases, the Supreme Court held that

the mere existence of basing-point systems and other uniform practices, in
charged. So that I think, from the standpoint of the industry in relation to consumers as a
group, you cannot say that the consumers as a group have been forced to pay more freight
than they have been saved.
27. Id. at 85-86.
28. 26 STAT. 209 (i8go), 15 U. S. C. A. § i (1927).
29. The "rule of reason" doctrine applies the standard that not every combination in restraint of trade is unlawful, but only those which were unreasonable or undue either because
of their inherent nature or effect, or because of their evident purpose. Standard Oil v. United
States, 221 U. S. I (1911) ; United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. io6 (1911) ;
United States v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n, 224 U. S. 383 (1912) ; United States v. Union Pac.
R. R., 226 U. S. 61 (1912). Thus a burden is placed upon the government to prove that the
restraint of trade must be one involving an effective control of a substantial portion of an industry or it will fail in its prosecution. Standard Oil v. United States, 283 U. S. 163 (1931)
Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U. S. 344 (1933).
3 o . Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 563 (1925).
31. Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 588 (1925).
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the absence of an agreement, express or implied, is not a violation of the
Sherman Act. The Government brought the actions under the Act, alleging
and proving many uniform practices among the manufacturers involved.
Since the Clayton Act was not involved, the question of price discrimination
by virtue of the basing-points was little stressed. The Supreme Court, however, did attempt to justify the basing-point practices and seemed willing to
risk the danger of the establishment of uniform price agreements through
the mechanism of basing-point systems. In view of the Court's language it is
difficult to believe that it would condemn those systems under the old Section
32 The Court stressed the fact that it was the custom
2 of the Clayton Act.
of the trade to quote a delivered price and that purchasers would usually buy
on no other basis. The Court described the basing-point system in the Maple
Flooring case as follows:
"Through the agency of the Secretary of the Association a booklet
was compiled and distributed to members of the Association showing
freight rates from Cadillac, Michigan, to numerous points throughout
the United States to which the finished flooring is shipped by members
of the Association. It appears from the evidence to have been the usual
practice in the maple flooring trade, to quote flooring at a delivered
price and that purchasers of flooring usually will not buy on any other
basis. The evidence, however, is undisputed that the defendants quote
and sell on an f. o. b. mill basis whenever a purchaser so requests. It
also appears that the mills of most of the members of the Association
are located in small towns in Michigan and Wisconsin and that the
average freight rates from these principal producing points in Michigan
and Wisconsin to the principal centers of consumption in the United
States are approximately the same as the freight rate from Cadillac,
Michigan, to the same centers of consumption. There is abundant evidence that there were delays in securing quotations of freight rates from
the local agents of carriers in towns in which the factories of defendants
are located, which seriously interfered with prompt quotations of delivered prices to customers; that the actual aggregate difference between
local freight rates for most of defendant's mills and the rate appearing
in defendant's freight-rate book based on rates at Cadillac, Michigan,
were so small as to be only nominal, and that the freight-rate book
served a useful and legitimate purpose in enabling members to quote
promptly a delivered price on their product by adding to their mill price
a previously calculated freight-rate which approximated closely to the
actual rate from their own mill towns." 33

In the Maple Flooring case there was a single basing-point at Cadillac,
Michigan, and all but two members of the association were located in Michigan or Wisconsin (one was in Illinois and the other in New York). On
32. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 13 (1927).
33. 268 U. S. 563, 570-571 (1925).

BASING-POINT AND FREIGHT-ZONE PRICE SYSTEMS

shipments to any distance the discrepancies between freight from the mill and
freight from Cadillac were small. Within and near the region in which the
mills were located the discrepancies would react against all the manufacturers
fairly equally.
One significant statement in the quotation above must be emphasized
before passing on to the Court's discussion of the legal effects of such a practice. This statement sets forth the fact that the manufacturers involved
would quote a price f. o. b. mill whenever a purchaser requested such a quotation. Although the Court does not specially stress this fact in the opinion, it
may readily be seen that such a practice would be an effective check on producers to make the freight rates quoted from the basing-point approximately
the same as the actual freight rate from the place of manufacture. Without
such a practical check on the difference between actual freight rates and
freight rates from a basing-point the Court might consider any scheme in a
much less favorable light.
In the Maple Flooringcase the government based its criticism of the use
of the freight-rate book on the ground that, although the Maple Flooring
Association did not publish delivered prices in the freight book, the publishing of the freight-rate book and the circulation of tables of estimated cost
of flooring effectively enabled the members of the association to arrive at a
uniform delivered price by adding to the estimated cost the circulated freight
rate. It was argued that this was merely a device so that a fixed minimum
price would be maintained. The Court found that, although the data as to
the available cost of flooring, together with the calculated freight rate, could
readily be made the basis for a price-fixing agreement, nevertheless, there
was no violation of the Sherman Act since it was not established that the
defendants had entered into an agreement to use this material in that manner.
It pointed out that the record presented solely the question of whether the use
of this material would necessarily result in an unreasonable restraint of interstate commerce. In the absence of a purpose to monopolize or the compulsion that results from a combination or agreement, it felt that an individual could exercise great freedom in his activities without causing a restraint
of trade. It was held, therefore, that no restraint had been proved in the
Maple Flooring case.

The Cement case similarly involved the activities of a trade association
which compiled and distributed freight-rate books among its members. The
members of the Cement Association were all located in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia, in which area it was customary
to employ four basing-points, Universal, Pa., Lehigh Valley, Pa., Hudson,
N. Y., and Fordwick, Va. The freight-rate books gave the rate of freight
from these four basing-points to numerous points of delivery within the ter-
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ritorial area served by the members of the association. These rates were
compiled from official tariffs and translated from a rate per ton into a rate
per barrel of cement so as to be in more convenient form. The Court found
that prior to the existence of the association similar books were prepared by
individual manufacturers at a greatly increased cost and with a greater possibility of error than existed when compiled on behalf of all of the individual
manufacturers by the association. In its opinion it stressed the fact that it
was the custom in the cement trade to sell cement on a "one price" or a delivered-price basis even prior to the organization of the defendant association,
and that in every instance the basing-points were points of actual shipment
from which the larger proportion of the cement in a given locality was
actually shipped. The Court also found that these freight-rate books were a
great convenience in quoting prices accurately and promptly.
The system in and of itself was held not to be a violation of the Sherman Act on the same grounds as were employed in the Maple Flooringcase.
The Court also discussed and apparently approved the use of the basingpoint system of pricing cement. One of the reasons for such a justification
was the history of freight rates applied to competing mills in the Lehigh Valley. There the Interstate Commerce Commission established a blanket rate
so that freight charges would be identical for competing mills. The multiple
basing-point system of the cement industry merely amounted to each individual company's equalizing the freight rate applicable to competing mills in
a manner similar to the Interstate Commerce Commission's ruling. In the
absence of agreement establishing or maintaining such a system, it represented an attempt by each individual to meet competition.
In the Cement case, the manufacturers may or may not have been willing to sell on-an f. o. b. mill price. The opinion makes no mention of what
the practice was. The petition, however, sets forth that: "Defendant corporations, without exception, make all sales f. o. b. point of delivery. . ... 34
The decree of the District Court enjoined the manufacturers from agreeing
to sell exclusively f. o. b. point of delivery. This decree was set aside by the
higher court. This would lead one to believe that the Supreme Court did not
consider sales f. o. b. manufacturing point a very decisive factor. Of course,
this fact might be very influential, and it must be remembered that the Court
did not in reality specifically pass on the question.
In the Maple Flooringand the Cement cases the Supreme Court went so
far as to approve specially the gathering and dissemination of information
with reference to the transportation costs from the chief points of production, although such information certainly tended to maintain the industry
34. Decree of District Court, par. 9 (c).
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custom of using basing-points, on the ground that it was an aid to quick and
35
accurate price quotation.

The freight problem in the recent Sugar Institute case 36 was complex
in form, 37 and the District Court found an agreement to adhere to a delivered-price system. Although the defendants waived their assignment of
error on this point in order to reduce the issues, the Supreme Court stated
that the -delivered prices were not arrived at pursuant to an agreement but
that the defendants had agreed to maintain the delivered-price system.
The Court then found that this "concerted maintenance of delivered
prices constituted undue and unreasonable restraint of trade." 38
In two other Supreme Court cases there were systems involving freight
zones or basing-points. In American Column & Lumber Co. v. United
States,3 9 although the members of the Hardwood Lumber Association used
a basing-point system, 40 neither the briefs nor the opinion mentioned it. In
United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 41 the record disclosed the exist-

ence of a zoning system substantially similar to a basing-point system, and
Solicitor General Beck laid considerable stress upon its obviously artificial
character.42 The Court found an actual agreement in restraint of trade so
that it did not have to consider freight zoning per se. It did, however, make
43
a passing reference to the existence of a freight-rate zone system.
35. The Court in the Cement case recognized that such basing-point systems are an aid
to quick, accurate price quotations, when it stated: "Prompt quotation of a delivered price
therefore involves the ability to carry out promptly the mechanical process of adding to the
mill price the cost of transportation to the point of delivery. Lists of freight rates, in convenient and readily available form, are therefore necessary adjuncts to the quotation of deliv-

ery prices for cement." 268 U. S. 588, 598

(1925).

The Federal Trade Commission, however, arrives at the astounding conclusion that delivered prices do not simplify the calculation of freight charges. Thus it states: "The fact
that the industry will sell only on a delivery price basis leads to interminable complications in
the calculation of delivery charges." Fed. Trade Comm., supra note i, at 24.
36. Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U. S. 553 (936).
37. References to the freight problem (including an agreement not to make allowances
for shipping by differential routes) are to be found in the pleadings and decree of the Sugar
Institute case at the following places: Petition, pars. 20-33, PP. Io-I4; Answer, pars. i9-32;
Government Brief in District Court, pp. 239-293; Defendant's Brief on the facts in District
Court, pp. 202-238; Government Reply Brief in District Court, pp. 182-189; Findings in District Court, pars. 87-31, pp. 38-58, especially pars. 105-113, pp. 45-50; Order in District Court,
par. IV, i8-2o, pp. 5-6; Defendant's Brief in Supreme Court, pp. 224-246; Government Brief
in Supreme Court, pp. 124-I7z, especially at pp. 139-159; Defendant's Reply Brief in Supreme
Court, pp. 90-94.
38. 297 U. S. 553, 590 (1936).
39. 257 U. S. 377 (92).
40. See Transcript of Record on appeal to the Supreme Court, pp. 33-40.
41. 262 U. S. 371 (1923).
42. See Brief for United States, pp. 31 et seq., 142. Note also the references in Brief
for Ankeney Linseed Co., pp. 20, 36, 56, and Brief for Am. Linseed Oil Co., p. 12.
43. "The United States was divided into eight zones for price quoting; and it was stipulated that each member should quote a basic price for zone number one and should add thereto
one, two, four, six, seven, eight and eleven cents respectively, for the others." United States
v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U. S. 371, 386 (1923).
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Consent decrees have been entered in two cases involving destination
freight systems. United States v. Bolt, Nut & Rivet ManufacturersAssn 44
involved an agreement to use arbitrary basing-points for the quotation of
freight rates. The consent decree enjoined the agreement, 45 and also enjoined "individually

.

charging on account of such freight rates as

.

costs of transportation any amount at substantial variance from the actual
cost of such transportation where such charge or charges will result in an
unlawful discrimination in price". A consent decree was also entered in the
case of United States v. Corn Derivatives Institute.4 6 The petition charged
that "The defendants

.

.

.

agreed to adopt and have concertedly adopted

Chicago, Illinois, as an arbitrary freight basing-point from which they compute and charge freight in addition to the quoted prices, regardless of the
point from which Members actually ship Products." 47 The consent decree
is directed solely at an agreement, combination, or conspiracy to use a delivered-price system.

4

8

In Standard SanitaryManufacturingCo. v. United States491the defendants were enjoined from continuing their agreements to monopolize and re44. District Court for the Southern District of New York, petition in Equity No. 53-383.
The decree was entered March 17, 193I.
45. This decree further provides with reference to the agreement covering freight:
"That the defendants, . . . be and they hereby are perpetually enjoined, restrained
and prohibited:

. . .

(f) From agreeing

. . .

to establish or maintain, or con-

certedly establishing or maintaining, the basing point system which includes Pittsburgh,
Pa., Cleveland, Ohio, Birmingham, Ala., and Chicago, Ill., as the only base points . . .;
(j) From agreeing . . . to refuse or concertedly refusing or concertedly failing to
sell or quote prices . . . f. o. b. point of manufacture when requested so to do by the
purchaser or prospective purchaser thereof; . . :'
46. District Court of Illinois, petition filed and decree entered April 6, 1932.
47. At par. 31. It is further alleged that: "In accordance with a mutual understanding
among defendants, each Member has refused to quote prices for, or to make sales of, products
f. o. b. factory or on any basis other than f. o. b. Chicago; .
48. Par. 4 of the consent decree provides:
"That the defendants . . . be, and they hereby are, permanently and perpetually
enjoined and restrained . . .
(b) From arranging, agreeing, entering into any understanding or otherwise 'acting
in concert' . . .
Io. To refuse to quote prices for products f. o. b. point of manufacture, or to refuse to sell products at prices to apply at the point of manufacture."
49. 226 U. S. 2o (I912), aff'g I9I Fed. 172 (D. Md. 1911).

The zoning system aimed

at in this case was primarily a dividing of the country into exclusive selling territories. The
petition in equity contained the following allegations of the existence of a freight zoning system in par. 3:
"The defendants have divided the United States into certain territorial or geographical zones, and by their system of contracts are restricting each jobber in making sales to
the zone in which that jobber is located; in other words, the arrangement is such that no
jobber is allowed to sell outside his zone."
In the criminal actions of United States v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., Indictments Nos.
5163 and 5164 (E. D. Mich.), both filed December 6, I91O, there were allegations to the
effect that the defendants had employed freight zones in order to maintain resale prices.
The allegations are found in the First Indictment (No. 5163) in the fourth count, at page 71,
and state that the defendants agreed that:
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strain trade. In that case one of the elements of the agreement was the division of the United States into eleven freight zones for pricing purposes.5"
In a similar equity action against the Quaker Oats Company an injunction
was not secured because of the insufficiency of the proof.5 1
There can be little question that in most instances the courts would hold
that any agreement to use a freight destination system was a violation of the
Sherman Act. The agency contract of the Appalachian Coal Company, which
was sustained by the Supreme Court, 52 apparently contemplated that the
agency would fix a uniform delivered price for the products of the one hundred and thirty-six individual coal producers so that the competition between
individual members would not rest on geographical position. The plan, however, contemplated competition between the grades of coal sold by the
agency. 5 3 Basing-point and freight-zone price systems do not violate the
Sherman Act unless they are imposed or maintained as the result of an agreement, combination, or conspiracy which unduly restrains trade or tends to
create a monopoly.
the said United States was to be divided by the said defendants into eleven
territorial zones, the exact details of which said territorial zones are to the grand jurors
as yet unknown, except that all of the said corporations, partnerships and individuals who
were situated in any one zone were to resell at the same prices in said zone said sanitary
enameled iron ware in said commerce."
There are similar allegations in the Second Indictment (No. 5164) in count 5,at p. 54, and
count 6, at p. 77. The criminal actions against the Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. came
before the courts in 187 Fed. 229 (E. D. Mich. 1911). The question involved was
whether or not the defendants had secured immunity by testifying in the equity case in Maryland. After a trial lasting 6 weeks, the jury reported a disagreement on March 14, i912. At
a retrial in February, 1913, the defendants were found guilty and fines aggregating $5I,oo7.
were imposed.
5o. Facts with reference to the zoning systems in Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United
States, 226 U. S. 20 (1912), are set forth in the Government's Brief before the Supreme Court,
p. 3 et seq.
5i. The case of United States v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 Fed. 499 (N. D. Ill. 1916), involved an equity petition filed by the Government on June II, 1913. The petition alleged a
combination to restrain and monopolize interstate commerce in oatmeal and by-products therefrom. The petition itself does not set forth the existence of a delivered price system, but the
brief on behalf of the Quaker Oats Co. attempts to justify the existence of such a system
on the grounds that it "did not put the wholesaler at a disadvantage in competing with some
other wholesaler at a different point in common territory who, by reason of a somewhat lower
freight rate, might resell goods at a lower price from the same mill if this arrangement were
not in existence." Petition, at p. 71. The practice of the Quaker Oats Co., and at least one
of its competitors, involved the maintenance of a uniform freight charge from their points of
production to a group of cities, although the actual freight rates to those cities were not uniform. The cities involved were supposed to be places from which wholesale houses were
competing against each other for sales in a common territory.
The case was argued before the Circuit Judges in March 1916, and decided adversely to
the Government. An appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed upon the Government's
own motion. 253 U. S.499 (X920).
The case of United States v. Con; Products Refining Co., cited and discussed infra page
704, was held to involve a combination in restraint of trade amounting to a monopoly, but the
zone system in question was found not to discriminate between purchasers.
52. Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U. S.344 (933).
53. The basic agency agreement provided that the price of coal would be fixed by the
corporate selling agent (Finding of Fact No. 48a). See Brief for Appellant in the Supreme
Court, pp. 35-37.
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THE CLAYTON ACT

There have been no cases in the federal courts where the precise question
was whether such freight systems amounted to discriminations in violation of
the old Section 2 of the Clayton Act. 5 4 The complaint in In the Matter of
United Steel Corporation'5charged violation of both the old Section 2 of
that Act and of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 5 6 In view
of the Robinson-Patman Act, 57 it will be necessary to deal first with cases
arising under the old section, and then with the question as to whether the
Robinson-Patman Act broadens the law against discriminations so as to
cover this question.
The Maple Flooring and Cement cases, which were treated at length
under the discussion of the Sherman Act, give some insight into the problem
of the reaction of the courts to the question of the validity of basing-point
systems under the Clayton Act. In view of the Supreme Court's language
it is difficult to believe that such systems would be held to be discriminatory.
In both cases the Court went to considerable length to justify the practices
of supplying information which would be useful only in the operation of
basing-points in these industries and points out the logical basis for the existence of such systems. The reasoning applied by the Supreme Court in
these cases will apply equally well to freight-zone and delivered-price sys58
tems. Thus the case of United States v. Corn Products Refining Co.
involved a petition in equity to enjoin a combination in restraint of trade.
The court, while entering a decree dissolving the Corn Products Refining
Company on the ground that the combination amounted to a monopoly, discussed the contention that the activities of the defendants had resulted in a
discrimination in prices. Judge Learned Hand held that a zone system if
equitably organized need not result in an actual discrimination in price
although it might theoretically appear to do so, saying:
"I can find no evidence of the misuse of the so-called 'zone system', a system which in itself is entirely capable of equitable application.

.

.

. In general, I find the evidence too scanty to justify any

finding that the defendants have attempted a genuine price discrimination, though they unquestionably had it in their power to do so." 59
54. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 13 (1927).
55. 8 FED. TRADE Com. DEC. (1924) I. This case will be discussed infra under

the treat-

ment of the Federal Trade Commission Act, since it never reached the courts.
56. 38 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. §45 (1927).

The pertinent portions provide:

"That unfair methods of competition in commerce are hereby declared unlawful . . .
57. Supra note 13.

58. 234 Fed. 964 (S. D. N. Y. 1916). The petition in that case does not specifically involve a charge of geographical price discrimination, but merely alleges the existence of an
illegal combination. It then proceeds to specify certain alleged unlawful and unfair acts of
the defendants. Even in this specification no mention is made of the fact that zones amounted
to unfair competition.
59. Id. at 994.
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There could be little doubt but that if proceedings had been brought
under the old Section 2 of the Clayton Act, such freight practices would
have been justified in most cases by the proviso allowing a seller to meet
competition in good faith.60
The Congressional debates on the Clayton Act reveal no references
which could be interpreted as showing an intention to outlaw freight destination practices. The purpose of Section 2 seemed to be to prevent sales
below cost or sales at a lower price in the community of their rivals than at
other points throughout the country, in order to drive out competitors and
thus to achieve a monopoly position. This was well expressed by Representative Floyd of Arkansas in the Congressional debates. 0 '
As further evidence of this fact more comprehensive provisions for
Section 2 were suggested as amendments; thus "discriminate in price" was
proposed to be amended to read "discriminate in price, terms or otherwise",
in order to broaden the operation of the section.6 2 Another amendment of
Section 2 was proposed by Senator Clapp of Minnesota,63 providing that
anyone
"selling a commodity at a lower rate in one section, community, or
locality than is charged for such commodity by said party in any other
section, community or locality, after making due allowance for the
difference, if any inthe actual cost of transportationfrom the point of
production if a raw product, or from the point of manufacture if a
manufactured produce (product), shall be deemed guilty of unfair discrimination

.

.

.

(Italics added)

The defeat of this amendment to Section 2 is a sound ground for asserting
that Congress did not intend to go as far in the statute enacted as the proposed amendment went.6 4 It should also be pointed out that congressmen
repeatedly referred to the practice of the Standard Oil Company and other
large companies in selling at a uniform price for an entire state, and yet they
never once suggested that Section 2 would operate to change this situation.
6o. The proviso states: "Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent . . .
discrimination in price in the same or different communities made in good faith to meet competition." 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 13 (1927).
61. "The provision is in plain language and seeks to prevent dealers from lowering the
price of commodities in different sections and communities by unfair discrimination with the
intent and purpose to destroy, ruin, or injure the business of a competitor. That is a recognized evil extensively practiced by great and powerful concerns to drive out competition and
destroy competitors, which results to the serious detriment of the general public, and has
been demonstrated to be a most effective means in acquiring a monopoly. It does that and
nothing more, and is not intended to do anything more." 51 CONG. RFC. 9158 (1914).
See
also id. at 926o, 9263-9264, 9552, 9595, 14208-14209, 14228, 14250.
62. Id. at 9265. Note the amendment by Representative Morgan of Oklahoma, which is
set forth in full together with comments thereon.
63. Id. at 14252-14253, 14597-14598.
64. Id. at 14597.
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The only statement made in the Congressional debates that would lead
one to conclude that freight destination systems were not to be protected,
even excluding the right to meet competition, is found in one remark of
Representative I-elvering of Kansas, 65 which is explainable on other
grounds: ".

.

. this practice will be absolutely prohibited, for the same

price will have to govern in every State, plus, of course, the difference in
cost of transportation." It is believed that this statement was not intended
to eliminate the possibility of freight destination practices, but rather to
explain that prices might vary to the extent of actual transportation charges.
The wording of the Clayton Act in the old Section 2 itself lends support to an argument that there is actual "discrimination" when customers
are given prices which make allowance for difference in shipping costs.
Section 2 acknowledges legal "discrimination" to include ". . . discrimination in price between purchasers of commodities . . . that makes only
due allowance for difference in the cost of selling or transportation . . ." 8

The wording is not conclusive, however, in view of the fact that the competitive evil of discrimination as originally envisaged by the Clayton Act
lies in the different positions in which customers are placed in their
competition with other customers, by the differing treatment accorded them
in prices, terms and allowances. Discrimination did not depend upon the
difference in net profit or net revenue which the seller realized from his
various customers. The result of the trend of the arguments against freight
systems is that the equalization of the profit to the seller is essential to the
removal of discrimination between customers. Viewed from that angle
their argument is not a very compelling one. 67 This real discrimination
which exists today under freight destination price systems is based upon
the fact that, as a result of a delivered-price system, customers located at
or near the place of manufacture or shipment (or in that part of a freight
zone nearest to the point of manufacture or the basic zone) are deprived
of the advantage of such location and often are required to contribute to
the cost of transportation of more distant customers, even though such customers frequently are in competition with each other.
Although such freight systems must of necessity result in discriminations when considered from the point of view of pure economic theory, yet
the old Section 2 of the Clayton Act was aimed at discriminations unreasonable in extent which tended to create a monopoly. It was certainly not
directed at old practices which were reasonably necessary to the carrying on
65. Id. at 9184.
66. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C.

A. §

i3 (,927).

67. American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F. (2d) 763 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930), cert.
denied, 282 U. S. 899 (i93i), held that Section 2 of the Clayton Act applied to a discrimination which gave to one consumer a price advantage in a material factor which was not given

to competing consumers.
245 (1929).

See also Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U. S.
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of efficient business and which did not tend to create a monopoly, or to
practices which were adopted in good faith to meet competition. It is easily
conceivable that some freight systems might be of such an artificial and
unreasonable nature that they could not be sustained on any ground except
that they were necessary to meet competition.
THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT

Heretofore, one of the chief bases for justifying delivered-price systems has been found in that part of the old Clayton Act which is now repealed,6 8 at least in its old form, and which specifically recognized the right
to quote different prices in good faith for the purpose of meeting competition. The Robinson-Patman Act 69 now raises a question as to whether
such destination prices are permissible or whether they constitute unlawful
70
price discriminations.
The Robinson-Patman Act as finally approved contained no special
reference to the freight situation. It is significant, however, that a number
of the proposed amendments to the old Clayton Act specifically covered this
controversial point.7 1 Thus the Patman Bill, as reported by the House,
provided "That the words 'price', as used in this section 2, shall be construed to mean the amount received by the vendor after deducting actual
freight or cost of other transportation, if any, allowed or defrayed by the
vendor." 72 The Utterback Bill contained similar language. 73 It is apparent
that such a provision would probably eliminate this problem provided that
a person could not in good faith meet competition, since no discriminations
68. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 13 (1927). See supra note 6o for the pertinent
proviso.
69. Supra note 13.
70. Many trade associations whose members manufacture and sell diverse types of products have compiled questions with reference to the effect of the new section 2 of the Clayton
Act. Considerable interest was shown in the question of whether the new law affected the
delivery charges. Sellers wanted to know whether the Act required uniform freight terms,
or whether it required selling on an f. o. b. mill basis. The question most often asked was:
"Is selling on a delivered price basis to customers located at unequal distances from the point
of supply prohibited?"
71. It is difficult to ascertain the origin of the Wheeler and Utterback Anti-Basing-Point
Bills, supra note 2, but they seem to express ideas that have long been promoted by the Federal Trade Commission. They may have developed as the result of the controversy between
NRA and the Federal Trade Commission in regard to the operation of the code for the
Iron and Steel Industry (see Federal Trade Commission report on this subject, mipra note 8)
during which time the Commission strenuously attacked the basing-point system in the steel
industry. Considerable impetus was probably given to these bills by the activities of municipal
purchasing agents, and such officials as Secretary Ickes. See N. Y. Times, April 10, 1936,
p. 9, col. 2, as to Boulder Dam bids on wire and cable. It is insignificant that the items bid
on in this incident were patented products covered by license agreements which compelled the
quotation of a uniform price, since the item represents the present attitude of some government officials.
72. H. R. 8442, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), as reported March 31, 1936, p. 7, lines 20-23.
This definition of price was eliminated on the floor of the House, 8o CoNG. REC. 8223-8224
(1936).
73. H. R. 10486, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., introduced January 22, 1936, 8o CONG. REc. 2889
(1936).
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in price were allowed by virtue of the other provisions of the Act.7 4 There
can be no doubt that such was in fact the intent of proponents of these provisions. 5
Congress deliberately rejected the attempt to prohibit systems of selling upon a delivered-price basis either throughout the entire United States
or by zones. The proposal provoked considerable opposition,7 6 especially
among farm leaders as well as from a number of industries. The House
Judiciary Committee eliminated this provision with the statement that otherwise the Act could not be passed; 77 and a number of Congressional leaders
expressed their opinion that the new law did not affect the basing-point
system.7 8 In submitting the conference report on the Robinson-Patman
Bill, Representative Utterback was careful to define "discrimination" so as
to avoid much, if not all, of the delivered-price controversy. He said,
"In its meaning as simple English a discrimination is more than
a mere difference. Underlying the meaning of the word is the idea
that some relationship exists between the parties to the discrimination
which entitles them to equal treatment, whereby the difference granted
to one casts some burden or disadvantage upon the other. . . . But
where no such relationship exists, where the goods are sold in different
markets and the conditions affecting those markets set different price
levels for them, the sale to different customers at those different prices
would not constitute a discrimination within the meaning of this bill." 79
When the delivered-price provision of the Patman Bill was eliminated,
in order to assure the passage of the balance of the bill, a new one was
introduced, the Wheeler Anti-Basing-Point Bill,8 0 which was intended to
cover completely the entire subject of freight allowances. As a result of
this legislative history it may be argued with some 'considerable degree of
74. It is apparent that the purpose of the provision was to prevent a company from quoting a destination price to one customer which, after deducting freight rate, would result in a
net price to the seller which was different from the net price received in a sale to a different
buyer. It should be noted, however, that one of the items of proof which would have been
required under this bill was that discrimination must be shown "substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them." H. R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1936) 14.
75. The report of the House Judiciary Committee on the Patman Bill, H. R. REP,. No.
2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), at p. 14, states with reference to this provision: "In effect,
this provision of the bill is designed to put an end to price discrimination through the medium
of the basing-point or delivered price system of selling commodities. It will require the use
of the f. o. b. method of sale."
76. Statement by Citron, 8o CONG. REc. 8223-8224 (1936) ; see also id. at 8122-8123 and
8126-8127.
77. Statements by Boileau, 8o CONG. R c. 8122-8123 (1936), and id. at 776o.
78. Statement by Borah, 8o CONG. REc. 9903-9904 (936), and id. at 8223-8224, 81228123, and 8126-8127.
79. 8o CONG. REc. 9416 (1936). There are other expressions to the same effect at id.
8223-8242.
8o. Supra note 2.
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effect that the amended Clayton Act was not intended to broaden the operation of the old Section 2 on freight practices, and that the law does not require the measurement of price discrimination in terms of "mill net" or
"factory" prices. "Price" will probably be construed as the amount paid
by the buyer. An examination of the statute, however, reveals that without
this legislative history a court might have listened more attentively to the
argument that there was discrimination, in view of the apparent elimination
of the general proviso which allowed a seller to meet competition in good
faith.
In view of the proviso in Section 2(b) 81 allowing a seller to meet an
equally low price of a competitor, it has been suggested that the amended
statute would require manufacturers to sell on some sort of a basing-point
system according to which the factory (or warehouse) of each competitor
could be used as a basing-point with the competitor's price at his factory
being the basing-point price. Such an interpretation depends on the statute
allowing a seller to discriminate in price among purchasers8 2from him, provided he is meeting an actual price quoted by a competitor.
It is felt that in view of the fact that Congress eliminated a specific
provision covering freight applications before passing the amended Clayton
Act, and also in view of the attempt to cover this subject by a separate
specific bill, a court would probably hold that such freight systems were not
discriminatory per se, but that each case must stand on the particular facts
involved in any given industry.
The Federal Trade Commission has recently issued a complaint against
the "Birmingham-Plus" system employed by certain cast iron pipe manufacturers.83 One of the counts in this complaint charges that an agreement
81. The pertinent proviso is:
"Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting
the prima facie case thus made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally
low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor." 49
STAT. 1526,

15 U. S. C. A. § 13 (b) (Supp. 1936).

82. There was discussion in both houses as to the effect of the new proviso compared with
the old. See Senator Van Nuys' remarks, 8o CoNG. REc. 99o3-99o4 (1936), and Representative Utterback's, id. at 9418. They both maintain that the present proviso is a rule of evidence, and does not affect the substantive provisions of the act. This view is difficult to understand, and will have to be clarified by the courts. See also Federal Trade Comm., Data in
Connection with the Robinson-Patman Act (1936) 22-24.
83. In Matter of Cast Iron Pipe Association, Fed. Trade Comm. Docket No. 3091 (complaint issued March 26, 1937), the complaint in two counts charges, first, that the respondents
agreed to employ a "single basing-point system" of pricing which was operated on a Birmingham-Plus basis; and second, that this agreement and the practices pursuant thereto resulted
in price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act.
The theory on which the "Birmingham-Plus" system is attacked is set forth in Count II,
par. 6, where it is alleged that delivered prices are not the actual prices received by respondents. This complaint is, therefore, based on the theory that in order to comply with the
Robinson-Patman Act each manufacturer must inaugurate a pricing system with a single
base price at his point of manufacture (or at his warehouses), to which would be added the
actual freight to the destination of each customer.
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to utilize and the utilization of a basing-point system amounts to a violation
of the Robinson-Patman Act. We may expect, after a decision of this
case, that the question of whether or not a basing-point system is illegal
under the Robinson-Patman Act will be determined.
It should be pointed out that if it were held that the Robinson-Patman
Act were applicable to destination freight systems, they would probably not
be illegal per se, but a question of fact would arise in each specific case upon
the question of whether the buyers were in competition with other buyers
from, or competitors of, the seller. The discrimination would, therefore, be
actionable only when someone is hurt in his business or, in the language of
the Act, "where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce,
or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either
grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with
customers of either of them".8 4 If no person or no line of competition is
hurt, then the act is not illegal. Of course, where buyers are in different
markets it is not likely that anyone will be injured by any such freight price
systems. In addition, a seller may still meet competition at destination, and
thus such freight systems may still be used under proper circumstances.
Some arguments may be made that no discrimination whatsoever exists
in the case of a flat delivered price system in view of the uniformity of
price, and apparently these arguments would apply in the zone situation only
if the buyers in one zone were not in competition with the buyers in another
zone, or if the difference in zone price is a function of, or proportional to,
85
the actual freight rate.
The legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act and the proviso
apparently condoning the meeting of a price of a competitor will probably
be sufficient to justify freight-destination price systems under the Act. It
must be remembered, also, that the delivered-price and analogous problems
do not arise in any form where "competition", as defined in the Act, is not
affected.
BEFORE THE TRADiE CoIrmIssIoN

In 1924, the Federal Trade Commission ordered the United States
Steel Corporation I6 and others to cease and desist from selling its rolled
steel products at a Pittsburgh price plus freight from Pittsburgh, on the
ground that this practice constituted a violation of Section 2 of the Clayton
Act, and that it was an "unfair method of competition" under Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act.8 7 The reasoning of the Commission
84. 49 STAT. 1526, 15 U. S. C. A. § 13 (a) (Supp. 1936).
85. See Kavits, Analysis of New Section 2 of Clayton Act made for NationalPaper Trade
Ass"n, Inc., N. Y. Times, July 20, 1936, p. 22, col. I.
86. Matter of United States Steel Corp., 8 FED. TRADE Com. DEC. (1924) I.

87. Supra note 56.
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was that a manufacturer, by adopting such delivered-price policies, was
"unfairly" discriminating among customers.18 It was found as a fact that
the discriminations under Pittsburgh-Plus were not made for any of the
purposes permitted by the Clayton Act, and the Commission specially stated
that "The prices thus made were not and are not made in good faith to meet
competition in different localities and communities". 9 It also found in
reference to Pittsburgh-Plus prices that "Pittsburgh-Plus adds millions
of dollars each year to the price paid by steel users outside of Pittsburgh,
which of course, must be eventually paid by the public." 90
Commissioner Gaskill wrote a vigorous memorandum of dissent in this
action, in which he found no legal basis for the cease and desist order. He
stated that he felt that the question was one for legislative correction, 9 and
that the Federal Trade Commission was going beyond the jurisdiction
granted to it by Congress. The dissent is also based on the theory that the
Federal Trade Commission Act does not establish a standard of absolute
freedom of competition, but allows the observance of sound economic
principles. 92
The respondents never attacked the validity of the Commission's cease
and desist order, but issued an announcement that, without conceding the
validity of the order, they had determined to conform thereto in so far as
practicable. As a matter of fact even before the order was issued the
United States Steel Corporation had found it inadvisable to adhere strictly
to the Pittsburgh basing-point system. Birmingham, Alabama and Chicago
were added as basing-points. Additional basing-points for different steel
and iron products were added, so that Cleveland, Worcester (Mass.) and
Duluth were added for wire products. Steel tubes had basing-points at
Pittsburgh, Lorain and Youngstown, Ohio, Wheeling, W. Va., and Chicago.
Although products were no longer quoted solely on a Pittsburgh base,
it appears that the delivered price generally quoted was in fact equivalent
to the old Pittsburgh-Plus price. Thus, while the mechanics of PittsburghPlus were generally modified, prices persisted at levels progressively higher
88. In Matter of the United States Steel Corp., 8 FED. TADE Com. DEC. (1924) z, 20,
the Findings of Fact, in par. 6 (h), state this discrimination in these words: "The respondents, in selling their respective steel products from their mills outside of Pittsburgh at Pittsburgh Plus prices discriminate among the customers of the same nill. In the case of two
steel users buying steel from the same mill outside of Pittsburgh, that steel user whose plant
has a less freight rate from Pittsburgh secured a less price from the respondent than his
competitor whose freight rate from Pittsburgh is greater. In other words, the actual freight
rates from the producing mill to the customers' plants do not determine the difference between
the delivered prices paid by customers buying steel from the same mill."

89. Id. at 38.
go. Id. at 35.

gi. "If the economists are right, the requirements of the situation will be met only by a
legislative recognition of the necessity for a more exact statement of the scientific relation

between business and economics and the declaration of that relation in the form of a law of
general application." Id. at 65.
92. Id. at 62.
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as the distance from Pittsburgh increased, and this although steel costs at
both Birmingham, Ala., and Gary, Ind., were considerably below costs at
Pittsburgh.
It is rather difficult to understand why the Commission has allowed
the steel industry to continue such practices unmolested after its entry of the
cease and desist order. It has been well aware of the workings of the steel
basing-point systems and has published numerous pamphlets concerning this
subject.9 3 It has issued four complaints against delivered-price practices
in other industries. One complaint was dismissed, 0 4 a second was settled
by a consent, cease and desist order, 95 and the other two are still pending.9" The Commission has also considered a basing-point system in a case
97
alleging a Sherman Act conspiracy.
In connection with proceedings before the Federal Trade Commission
it is well to remember that the jurisdiction of that body is not entirely
limited to violations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, provided the ac93. Fed. Trade Comm. reports listed mpra note 8. See also Fed. Trade Comm., Study of
the Zone-Price Formula in the Range Boiler Industry, 1936.
94. Fed. Trade Comm. complaint Docket No. 1461, which charged that sales of range
boilers were based "on a delivered and fixed lump sum basis . . ." was dismissed without
reason given, May I, 1931.
95. In Matter of Nat'l Electrical Mfrs. Ass'n, Docket No. 2565, the original complaint
was issued September 26, 1935, the amended complaint on November 16, 1935, while the consent cease and desist order was entered December 29, 1936. Both complaints charged an
agreement to use a delivered-price system. The findings of fact restated the allegations of
the original and amended complaints with reference to delivered price, and the cease and desist
order provided:
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that said respondent corporations . . . cease and desist
from doing and performing, by agreement, combination or conspiracy . . . the
following acts and things: . . . (7) Refusing to sell any buyer who so elects at a
price calculated f. o. b. point or place from which the goods purchased are actually
shipped; (8) Requiring that customers purchase only on a delivered price basis,
whether in the form of a single delivered price throughout the United States or throughout each of any number of price zones; . .
96. Matter of Cast Iron Pipe Ass'n, cited and discussed supra note 83, and Matter of the
Water Works Valve and Hydrant Group, Fed. Trade Comm. Docket No. 2958 (complaint
issued October 29, 1936, and amended November 16, 1936). The latter case alleges that the
agreed to divide . . . and have divided the United States into
respondents have ". .
zones, in which zones the said respondents have by agreement fixed and maintained
enhanced uniform delivered prices . . ." Most of the respondents filed an answer on February I, 1937, consenting to the entry of an order to cease and desist from any such agreement.
97. In Matter of North Dakota Wholesale Grocers Ass'n, 9 FED. TRADE CoAt. DEC.
(1925) 266, the complaint charged the association with entering into an agreement or understanding to fix uniform prices at which its members were to sell their products. The complaint itself did not charge an agreement to use a basing-point or freight-zone system. The
Commission found, however, that the respondents had entered into an agreement to fix and
maintain prices, and that pursuant to said conspiracy they had agreed that sugar should be sold
upon a common basing-point system. Price cards showing the agreed prices and freight
books showing the freight to be added to the base price from the common basing-point were
distributed among the respondents.
The Commission entered an order compelling the respondents to cease and desist from
agreeing upon and maintaining uniform selling prices. The order did not specifically direct
the respondents to cease and desist from using a basing-point system. The reason, perhaps,
for not having done so probably is that the Commission felt that in the absence of an agreement to fix and maintain prices the basing-point system would cease to exist.
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tivities are "unfair methods of competition". 9

s
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In the main, "unfair

methods of competition" have been limited to embrace only violations of
provisions of law or already established common law rights. The BeechNut 99 case, however, goes beyond these limits, but subsequent cases have
not extended 100 it beyond the original scope of the decision, which held
that complex systems for checking upon a failure to sell at suggested resale
prices may go so far beyond a simple refusal to sell to price cutters that
they are illegal, and that such individual policing or check-up systems are
illegal. In spite of the lack of authority on this situation, it is believed that
the courts might well permit the Commission to extend its activities to
include prosecutions of individual discriminations which, thougli legal under
the Clayton Act, nevertheless amount to unfair methods of competition
and clearly evade the intent of the Anti-Trust Laws though not contrary to
their specific provisions.
The Federal Trade Commission has expressed itself against basingpoint and delivered-price systems on numerous occasions. 10 1 Their expert
economic witnesses are rabid against all freighting systems which are not
based on the actual freight rate from the place of manufacture to the point
of consumptiQn. 1°2 The Commission is probably correct in believing that a
delivered-price policy results in an economic discrimination among customers. Thus some customers must purchase freight that they do not use
.or else they must pay a higher initial cost, depending upon from which
angle the process is viewed. This discrimination, of course, becomes less
and less as charges made for freight approach actual freight costs.
Even assuming that such freight systems were "unfair methods of
competition", 1 0 3 by virtue of Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam 104 the
,Commission can not proceed against any freight practices as unfair methods
of competition unless proof can be given that such practice appears to
threaten substantial injury to, or in fact does lessen, competition. The
Raladam case would be a complete defense if there were no competitors, and
it seems to offer a complete defense if all the companies in an industry
voluntarily follow the same practice; no attack is open unless it is proved
that (i) there is an agreement, or (2) that there is a discrimination which
tends to create a monopoly.
98. Federal Trade Comm. v. Beechnut Packing Co., 257 U S. 441 (1922).
99. Ibid.
ioo. The only apparent attempt to extend the Beechnut case to other factual situations
was defeated in Federal Trade Comm. v. Western. Meat Co., 272 U. S. 554 (1926), on the
very special grounds that the Commission was specifically authorized to enforce Section 7
of the Clayton Act and hence could not go beyond the scope of the remedies therein provided for.
IOl. Supra note 8.
102.

FEr-m, op. cit. supra note ii.

103. Federal Trade Commission Act, §
104. 283 U. S. 643 (1931).

5, 38

STAT.

719 (1914), I5 U. S. C. A. § 45 (1927).
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Under most circumstances it would be difficult to make out a case
where delivered-price practices were "unfair methods of competition" unless
they were clearly in no way reasonably related to freight costs and were not
necessary to the meeting of competition, or unless they had in fact resulted
and were resulting in a lessening of competition.
CONCLUSION

The Maple Flooring and Cement cases were treated at length because
they represent the only times that freight destination questions have ever
been seriously discussed by the courts. In the future the courts might hold
other freight destination systems unreasonable discriminations and make a
distinction between the basing-point systems used in the maple flooring and
cement industries and those developed in other industries. From the Supreme
Court's opinions in those two cases it is apparent that the basing-points were
used for the purpose of facilitating the calculation of delivered prices and
that they enabled manufacturers to know what mill-base price they would
have to set in order to quote a competitive price at any given destination.
Whenever the points of manufacture are closely concentrated and the
locations of basing-points are roughly central, and no single manufacturer
is placed in a particularly advantageous competitive position, then the discrimination involved does not tend substantially to lessen competition, restrain trade, or create a monopoly. In addition, when the points of production are comparatively close to the points of actual shipment there is no
systematic discrimination between customers. Since the chief consideration
in both these cases was the legality of open price trade associations, it has
been contended that the Court's apparent conclusion that there was no substantial discrimination is an ill-founded dictum based on a superficial analysis
of the nature and possible effect of basing-point systems. Granted, however,
that such policies are discriminatory, it does not follow that they can ipso
facto be ruled out. It would have to be a discrimination so as "substantially
to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly". 10 5 The purpose and
effect of the freight destination policies in most industries does not seem to
have resulted in monopoly, though it would seem that a complete uniformity
in freight policy would eliminate geographical location of factories as an
element in the competition between manufacturers. The Supreme Court
has held that not all price discriminations are illegal. 10 6 Such cases suggest
the possibility of sustaining a freight destination policy, although discriminatory in character, on the ground that it was a necessary device in
,O5. Clayton Act, §2, 38 STAT. 730 (914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 13 (1927).
io6. Fairmount Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U. S. I (1927), which held that state
anti-trust legislation could not forbid price discrimination made in good faith to meet competition, and that a purchaser could not be prohibited from paying a lower price in communities where competition did not exist and higher prices where it existed. Cf. Central Lumber
Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157 (I912), where it was held that a state could regulate discriminating sales made for the purpose of destroying competition.
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order to meet competition. A seller could probably also justify his practices if he followed those of the industry leader, since the mere fact of fol10 7
lowing the leader does not make the practice an illegal restraint of trade.
If, however, an actual agreement was proved among the sellers, there could
be no justification of the practice on such grounds, or on any grounds except
as indicated above in the discussion of the Sherman Act.
It is impossible even to outline the many factual variations which bear
on the reasonableness of freight destination systems. Since no authority
exists on the validity of one system as compared with another, it may be
safely assumed that the courts will examine with diligence the reasonableness of any freight destination systems which come before them.
The difficulty of predicting the effect of the Robinson-Patman Act on
this problem should be apparent. It should first be realized that the definition of "price" in the original Patman and Utterback Bills were not designed
to eliminate the discriminations covered by the original Clayton Act. They
were designed primarily to equalize the net profit or net revenue which a
seller actually realizes from his various customers. Before a court should
construe the Robinson-Patman Act to reach this result it should certainly
re-examine the basis of the Act and also consider the possible effects of an
interpretation which condemns freight price systems. If such an interpretation were made, it would result in many instances in destroying the equality
of price to which groups of customers have been accustomed. The gain of
one customer would certainly be the loss of another. It is unsound to examine delivered-price practices entirely from the point of view of whether
or not one system or the other would have been preferable from the beginning; the fact must be faced that many businesses have been built up
upon the principle of some freight destination system, and to disturb it now
would risk such a vast dislocation of the normal channels of seller and customer that any predicted countervailing advantages should be closely
scrutinized.
The answer to the question of whether there is substantial or unfair
discrimination among competitors must rest in a large measure on the facts
presented in a given case. It is safe to say, however, that the Supreme
Court has dealt sympathetically with freight destination systems which were
based on the stable custom of an industry and which appeared reasonable
and justifiable on their facts. If the sole purpose of a freight destination
system is artificially to extend the area in which a group of factories can
profitably operate, the system is open to some criticism; but if its purpose is
solely to meet competition in good faith, it is a reasonably justifiable business practice. The line between these two purposes is one which would be
almost impossible to draw even in a concrete case.
ro'. United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U. S. 693

(1929).

